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IIndicators of Monetary Policy:
The View from Implicit
Feedback Rules
FREQUENTLY CITED THEORETICAL
framework for the conduct of monetary policy
consists of a policy instrument, an intermediate
policy target and a long-run policy objective.
The policy instrument is a lever which the
central bank can manipulate to achieve its
intermediate target. Possible choices for the
policy instrument include the quantity of bank
reserves, the monetary base (hank reserves plus
currency in circulation) or a short-term interest
rate. Monetary policymakers aim at a value of
the intermediate target variable that will make
current monetary policy consistent with a long-
run policy objective, such as price stability.1
Potential intermediate target variables include
nominal gross domestic product (GUP) and mone-
tary aggregates. Ideally, the intermediate target
variable is both responsive to policy actions and
closely related to inflation in the long run.
In reality, however, the Federal Reserve does
not explicitly commit itself to a particular inter-
mediate target variable. Instead, policymakers
rely on a number of indicators to evaluate cur-
rent monetary policy. ln the context of a long-
run inflation objective, the stance of monetary
policy can be interpreted in terms of whether
current policy actions are expected to lead to
eventual accelerations or decelerations in the in-
flation rate. Policy indicators are variables
(perhaps generated within models) believed to
provide reliable information on the stance of
current policy. Unfortunately, traditional indica-
tors of monetary policy have given unusually
mixed signals in the last several years.2 For in-
stance, some economists believe that recent
rapid Ml growth portends future increases in
inflation, whereas others find signs of further
disinflation in slow M2 growth.~To overcome
this problem, some researchers have suggested
characterizing policy with alternative models of
the way the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) responds to feedback from potential
target variables, such as nominal GDP and M2.4
These models provide a baseline policy, a path
of prescribed movements of the policy instru-
1In this article, I assume that the long-run objective is a low
(possibly zero) average inflation rate.
2One way to infer the stance of monetary policy in a world
of multiple, possibly conflicting, policy indicators is the nar-
rative approach, first pioneered by Friedman and Schwartz
(1963) and re-introduced by Romer and Romer (1989). The
narrative approach involves careful study of the historical
record, especially summaries of policymaking meetings, to
determine the policy intentions of the monetary authority.
Many studies using this methodology evaluate economic
performance following dates when policy intentions seemed
to shift sharply. The retrospective nature of the
narrative approach limits its usefulness to policymakers,
however, because they often wish to assess whether recent
policy actions have been consistent with long-term ob-
jectives.
3Ritter’s (1993) synopsis of FOMC policy discussions in
1992 refers to the conflicting signals from Ml and M2 as a
monetary conundrum.
4Motley and Judd (1993), for example, have suggested using
monetary rules as a source of a baseline policy for the pur-
poses of policy discussion.24
ment, which we can compare with actual poli-
cy, the actual path of instrument movements.
The difference between the actual path and the
prescribed path of the policy instrument consti-
tutes a measure of the stance of policy relative
to the baseline. In this way, the five models of
policy in this article generate five monetary
policy indicators that can suggest whether re-
cent policy has changed relative to baselines.
Alternatively, because the FOMC does not ex-
plicitly identify a particular intermediate target
variable, one can view the models of policy exa-
mined in this article as investigations into
whether the FOMC conducts policy as if nomi-
nal GOP or M2 were the intermediate target
variable. Nominal GOP targeting, in particular,
has attracted attention in recent years as a way
to achieve an average inflation rate close to
zero in the long run by constraining nominal
GOP so it grows at about the rate of the real
economy.5
This article uses implicit feedback rules as
models of policy to generate monetary policy in-
dicatoxs. As with all indicators, indicators gener-
ated from these models of policy can give
conflicting signals, yet the assumptions that lie
behind each feedback rule are sufficiently testa-
ble to allow some scrutiny of the reliability of a
given policy indicator. Therefore, 1 generate and
evaluate five policy indicators, based on differ-
ent sets of assumptions, before reaching some
tentative conclusions. Three of the policy models
assume that nominal GOP is the intermediate
t.arget variable and two use M2.
Results from two of the nominal GOP target-
ing models of policy suggest that the FOMC tar-
geted long-run nominal GOP growth at either a
4.4 percent annual rate or a 6.5 percent rate
from 1983 to 1990. The former model indicates
that monetary base growth has been too rapid
since 1990, relative to the model’s prescriptions.
The latter model, in contrast, indicates that
monetary base growth has been too slow since
1990, relative to that model’s prescriptions. The
third nominal GOP targeting model implies that
the FOMC was targeting nominal GOP growth at
a 5.7 percent rate from 1983 to 1990. According
to the third model, monetary policy actions ac-
commodated lower nominal GOP growth in the
recession of 1990-91 without providing clear-cut
evidence of a change in the long-run inflation
objective between the 1980s and 1990s.
The results also suggest that monetary policy
in the early 1990s has generally been consistent
with the two models of M2 targeting studied
here. In these models, the ratio between M2
and the monetary base must he predicted one
quarter ahead. Ifind that the recent slow growth
in M2, relative to the FOMC target ranges, could
be attributable to prediction errors resulting
from a breakdown in the relationship between
the monetary base and M2. In other words,
it is difficult in the current financial environ-
ment to forecast the effects of policy actions on
M2. Furthermore, forecasting results suggest
that the breakdown in the relationship between
M2 and the monetary base is more severe than
the much-discussed breakdown in M2 velocity.
FEEDBACK RULES
For the purposes of this paper, a feedback
rule is a pre-commitment on the part of the
monetary authority as to how it will use policy
levers in response to developments in its inter-
mediate target variable. Under a feedback rule,
the Fed would monitor the target variable and
adjust its instruments in response, hut these
conditional responses would he pre-specified.
One well-known feedback rule proposed by
McCallum (1987) uses the adjusted monetary
base as a policy instrument to target nominal
GOP. All three models of nominal GOP targeting
in this article share the assumption in McCal-
lum’s rule that the long-run inflation objective
remains constant.°If the inflation objective
were to change, the nominal GOP targeting
feedback rules would change also. The adjusted
monetary base serves as a convenient measure
of the use of policy levers, because Federal
Reserve policy actions are quantitatively summa-
rized in the adjusted base: changes in nonbor-
rowed reserves, borrowed reserves and reserve
requirements. McCallum’s rule serves as one
model of de facto Fed policy, whereby the Fed
5Bradley and Janssen (1989) summarize the rationale for
nominal GNP targeting.
6The nominal GDP targeting models target a constant rate
of long-run nominal GDP growth, as will be shown below.
Assuming that the long-term growth rate for the real econo-
my is constant and policy-invariant, the long-term inflation
objective will be constant.25
is assumed to target a growth path for nominal
GOP.
If the FOMC were targeting MZ, rather than
nominal GOP, how might such a policy be imple-
mented? As a second model of de facto Fed poli-
cy, I assume that the Fed gears its policy (again
summarized by the changes in the adjusted
monetary base) to target M2 at the midpoint of
the M2 cone, which the Fed reports every year
in its Monetary Policy Objectives publication.’ If
the announced cone were the policy objective
such that the Fed limited itself to policies in-
tended to steer M2 toward the midpoint, then
we could consider M2 targeting to be a short-
run feedback rule.
Like McCallum’s nominal GOP targeting rule,
M2 targeting models generate implied policies in
terms of base growth.~Recent base growth can
then be characterized as consistent or inconsis-
tent with the model-implied policies. Unlike the
nominal GOP targeting models of policy, how-
ever, the two M2 feedback rules do not neces-
sarily assume that the long-run inflation objective
remains constant. If one accepts the proposition
of Hallman, Porter and Small (1991) that the
long-run velocity of M2 is constant, then a per-
manent change in the target rate of ME growth
implies a permanent change in the target rate
of nominal GOP growth and in the long-run in-
flation objective.
The Role of Forecasts in
Feedback Rules
Models in which ME is the target variable re-
quire forecasts of the ratio between ME and the
monetary base to identify the rate of base
growth believed sufficient to put it at the mid-
point of the FOMC’s target range. If the FOMC
were targeting nominal GOP with McCallum’s
rule, on the other hand, it would require fore-
casts of the velocity of the monetary base. One
way to make these forecasts is to use average
velocity growth over the past four years as a
forecast of the next quarter’s velocity growth.~
Moving-average (MA) forecasts gradually incor-
porate shifts in the trend of velocity growth, yet
assume that many changes in velocity growth
are transitory. As an alternative, Oueker (1993)
generates forecasts of base velocity with a time-
varying coefficient (TVC) regression model ~vith
heteroscedastic errors. An advantage of the TVC
regression model, relative to a four-year moving
average, is that the forecasting information set
includes not only past values of the dependent
variable, but also a host of explanatory variables.’°
The advantage ofallowing for time-varying co-
efficients, relative to fixed-coefficient models, is
that they can adapt to structural breaks in the
relationships between the dependent and ex-
planatory variables. This article includes com-
parisons of models of monetary policy that use
both the moving-average forecast method and
the TVC forecast method.
A Forecast Comparison for
Base Velocity
Because forecasts play a large role in the
models of monetary policy presented here,
figure 1 illustrates the forecast performance of
the time-varying coefficient model for quarterly
base velocity growth.” In general, the TVC
model forecasts base velocity well until 1991, af-
ter which the model has overpredicted base-
velocity growth. As a comparison, figure 1 in-
cludes four-year, moving-average forecasts and
shows that the MA forecasts display much less
variation than forecasts from the TVC model.
This difference suggests that the choice of fore-
casting models can have a large impact on
nominal GOP targeting models. It is also worth
noting that the mean-squared forecast error for
the moving average is more than three times
that of the TVC model. Nevertheless, figure 1
shows that since 1991 both forecast methods
have been overpredicting base velocity growth
by similar magnitudes.
‘Congress, in the Humphrey-Hawkins Act of 1978, requires
the Federal Reserve to report any targets it sets for mone-
tary aggregates, although such targets may not necessarily
be a primary objectve of monetary policy.
8There are, of course, many other possible targets, but I
restrict attention to these two interesting cases.
9McCalIum (1987) uses four-year, moving-average forecasts.
10The explanatory variables used were lagged changes in
the three-month Treasury bill rate and lagged growth in the
monetary base. Future work might include a long-term
bond rate as well.
11The appendix discusses the specification of the forecasting
model.26
Figure 1
Quarterly Growth in Base Velocity, Forecasted Growth
from TVC Model and Four-Year, Moving-Average Forecasts
CHARACTERIZING MONETARY
POLICY FROM 1983-1990 WITH
NOMINAL GDP FEEDBACK RULES
Fixed GDP Target Paths
McCallum-type monetary rules offer models of
nominal GOP targeting policies:”
(1) AInMB, = A0
— ~lnV,,, + A,(lnGDP-InGDP),,
AInGDP, = A~,Vt,
where MB is the monetary base, AlnV, ,, is the
forecasted value of base velocity growth, and
GOP is the target level of nominal GOP. The
parameter A0 equals the growth rate of target
nominal GOP, whereas A, specifies how much to
raise base growth in the coming quarter in
response to a given percentage gap between tar-
get and actual nominal GOP. So, in characteriz-
ing monetary policy with a monetary rule such
as equation (1), one must choose a velocity fore-
casting model, specify in which quarter actual
and target nominal GOP were equal, and choose
values for A0 and A,. This section compares
models of monetary base growth stemming
from two versions of the nominal GOP feedback
rule found in equation (1): One model uses a
time-varying coefficient model to generate fore-
casts of base velocity growth and the other uses
four-year, moving-average forecasts. The former
will be called the TVC GOP model and the latter
the MA GOP model. For each model, parameter
values for A0 and A, are chosen to minimize the
mean-squared error between actual base growth
and the model-implied base growth from the
third quarter of 1983 to the first quarter of
1990. ‘I’o examine whether implicit monetary
policy feedback rules benchmarked in the 1980s
can explain monetary policy actions to the
present, post-1990 data are left as out-of-sample
observations.
“See McCallum (1987) for details of his proposed rule.
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Figure 2
Quarterly Growth in Monetary Base and Growth Implied by a






Results for TVC GDP Model
For the TVC GOP model, the minimum mean-
squared error over this time period is achieved
when A0
= 0.0159, A, = 0275 and GDP = GOP
in the first quarter of 1985.13 A value of 0.0159
for A0 corresponds to a 6.5 percent annual
growth rate for target nominal GOP. Figure 2
plots the base growth implied by the TVC GOP
model and actual base growth. The TVC GOP
model explains the in-sample, pre-1990 data fair-
ly well but, since 1990, base growth has been
below that implied by the model. Figure 3 plots
nominal GOP and the target level implied by the
TVC GOP model. It shows a slowing in nominal
GOP growth since mid-1990. The growing gap
between the rule-implied target and actual
nBecause of the feedback rule uses the log-level of nominal
GDP, discrepancies between first-release nominal GOP
data and revised data will not have a large effect on im-
plied base growth. Consider, for example, a revision in an-
nual nominal GOP growth of 2 percent. This relatively large
revision would change the log-level of nominal GOP by
about one-half of I percent for that quarter. When multi-
plied by A1 =0.275, the revision would cause a change in
the implied growth rate of the monetary base equal to
0.00136. Given the variation of implied base growth in
nominal GOP accounts for the high rates of
base growth implied by the model from 1991 to
the present. The feedback rule in the TVC GOP
model would call for an increase of 1.1 percent
in the annualized growth rate of the monetary
base for every percentage point gap between
target and actual nominal GOP. Because actual
base growth has not been increased according to
this formula in the 1990s, the results are consis-
tent with the view that the FOMC is implicitly
targeting a lower path for nominal GOP.
Moreover, the fact that the ‘I’VC forecasts have
been overpredicting base growth in the 1990s
(as shown in figure 1) only buttresses this find-
ing because, without the forecast errors, the
‘PVC GOP model would have implied even faster
base growth since 1991.
figure 3, the effect of using revised data is not of a conse-
quential magnitude.
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Figure 3
Logarithm of Nominal GDP and Target Level Implied by a









Results for MA GDP Model
It is also possible to characterize policy with a
model of nominal GOP targeting that uses 16-
quarter, moving-average forecasts of base veloci-
ty, as suggested by McCallum (1987), in what
we call the MA GOP model:
(2) AInMB, = — ~UnV,,—lnV,,7)
+ A,(InGDP-InGDP),,
AInGDP, = A0 Vt,
where V stands for the velocity of the monetary
base. The MA GOP model explains base growth
in the middle to late 1980s with a target path
for nominal c;np that is very different from
that of the TVC GOP model. The nominal GOP
feedback rule with moving-average forecasts ex-
plains base growth from the third quarter of
1983 to the first quarter of 1990 with minimum
mean-squared error when A0
= aoios, which
corresponds with a 4.4 percent annual growth
rate for target nominal GOP, A, = 0.0945 and
GDP= GOP in the first quarter of 1989.14
The results suggest that inferences regarding
a target path for nominal GOP are sensitive to
the method of forecasting base velocity growth,
even though the forecasted values from the two
methods have nearly identical means. Figure 4
plots nominal GOP and the target level defined
by the MA GOP model. This model suggests that
the long-term nominal GOP target growth rate
was a relatively low 4.4 percent annual rate in
the 1980s. The MA GOP model would explain
rapid nominal GOP growth in the middle to late
1980s by indicating that nominal GOP stood well
below the target level following the 1981-82
recession. In this case, nominal GOP could grow
at about a 7 percent rate without exceeding the
target level until 1989. Moreover, nominal GOP
has remained only slightly above the implied
‘4The optimal values of the feedback parameters, A,=a275
for the model that uses forecasts from the TVC model and
A, =aogs for the model that uses moving-average forecasts,
are close to the values that worked well in simulations of
the two rules in Dueker (1993), 0.25 and 0.10, respectively.
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Figure 4
Logarithm of Nominal GDP andTarget Level as Defined












the post-1990, out-of-sample ob-
Figure 5 shows that the MA GOP model called
for much less variation in base growth than ac~
tually took place. The smoothness in the implied
base growth rates owes to the four-year,
moving-average forecasts of base velocity.
Smoothness, however, should not be confused
with constancy. The rate of base growth implied
by the MA GOP model decreases significantly
between 1984 and 1990, as the gap between
target and actual nominal GOP narrowed. In the
post-1990, out-of-sample period, base growth
has consistently been above that implied by the
MA GOP rule. Nevertheless, because the
moving-average forecasts have generally over-
predicted base velocity growth since 1990, as
shown in figure 2, the model would have im-
plied faster base growth and, therefore, would
have been closer to actual base growth, without
the forecast errors.
Given the striking differences in the target
paths for nominal GOP implied by the TVC and
MA GOP models, it is not surprising that oppos-
ing conclusions emerge concerning whether
base growth in the early 1990s has been too
high or too low to be consistent with the two
models. Actual base growth since 1990 has
generally been lower than that implied by the
TVC GOP model and too high to be consistent
with the MA GOP model, despite the fact that
both models have experienced similar forecast
errors since 1991.
Rebased GDP Target Paths
Both of the above models, however, might be
overly influenced by the assumption that the
FOMC has relentlessly pursued a constant growth
path for nominal GOP without making allowances
for past mistakes. McCallum (1993) has proposed
an alternative to targeting a time-invariant,
constant growth path for nominal GOP by mak-
ing this period’s nominal GOP target level a
weighted average of last period’s target and ac-
tual levels:
(3) InGDP, = A0
+ 6 InGDP,, + (1—6) InGOP,,
83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93
Setting 6 = I recovers the time-invariant, con-30
Figure 5
Quarterly Growth in Monetary Base and Growth Implied
by a Model of Nominal GDP Targeting That Uses Moving-
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stant growth target path used in the TVC and
MA GOP models, whereas setting 6=0 means
that, quarter after quarter, the target is to
achieve nominal GOP growth equal to A0 and no
attempt is made to correct for past mistakes.”
Feldstein and Stock (1993), for example, use a
nominal GOP targeting model that sets 6 = 0. A
value of 6 between zero and one allows inter-
mediate cases between targeting a constant
growth rate period by period (6 = 0) and target-
ing a fixed, pre-specified path for nominal GOP
(6= 1). If 6=1, past mistakes are always correct-
ed and never accommodated. If 6 = 0, past mis-
takes are never corrected and immediately
accommodated. If 6 is between zero and one,
past mistakes are gradually accommodated.
To relax the assumption that all past mistakes
will be corrected later, base growth is modeled
using a nominal GOP feedback rule with target
nominal GOP determined by equation (3). This
model, which uses the time-varying coefficient
model to forecast base velocity, is called the re-
based target GOP model. The parameter values
that minimize the mean-squared error between
actual and model-implied base growth from the
third quarter of 1983 to the first quarter of
1990 are A,, = 0.0140, which corresponds with a
5.7 percent annual rate for target nominal GOP
growth, A,=1.043, 6=698 and GDP=GDP in the
first quarter of 1989. Gradually rebasing the
nominal GOP target, as indicated by 6 < 1, pre-
vents nominal GOP from deviating far from its
target level, and thereby permits a larger value
for the feedback parameter, A,. Figure 6 plots
the actual and target levels of nominal GOP,
where the target level is defined by the rehased
target GOP model. The chart shows that rebas-
ing the nominal GOP target gradually accommo-
dates past periods of nominal GOP growth
“Targeting a fixed, pre-specified path for nominal GDP as
opposed to a constant growth rate, period by period, is
analogous to targeting the price level as opposed to target-
ing the inflation rate at zero each period. In each case, the
choice hinges on whether to accommodate one-time shifts
in the level.31
Figure 6
Logarithm of Nominal GDP and Target Level as Defined by a
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above or below the expected 5.7 percent rate.
The 1990-91 recession, for example, brought a
slowdown in nominal GOP growth that tem-
porarily created a positive gap between target
and actual nominal GOP. By early 1993, the gap
had been bridged, in part due to rebasing the
target, as evidenced by a shallowing in the slope
of the target path for nominal GOP since 1990.
Figure 7 shows the actual and model-implied
monetary base growth rates for the rebased tar-
get GOP model. ‘I’he model explains base growth
quite well until mid-I 990, which is the begin-
ning of the out-of-sample period and also the
onset of the recession. Ouring the recession and
recovery, actual base growth remained below
that implied by the rebased target GOP model
until mid-1992. As figure 1 shows, however, the
TVC forecasts of base velocity have tended to
overpredict base velocity growth in the early
1990s, so the rebased target model, like the
other nominal GOP targeting models, would
have implied even higher base growth without
the forecast errors.
in-sample (1983-90) mean-squared error than
either the TVC GOP or MA GOP model. Table 1
contains summary measures of the bias and
mean-squared error between actual and model-
implied base growth, both in- and out-of-sample,
for each of the three GOP targeting models. The
TVC and MA GOP models explain base growth
with nearly identical success, which is some-
what surprising considering the dissimilarity of
their implied target paths for nominal GOP.
They also do slightly better than the rebased
target GOP model (in terms of mean-squared er-
ror) in explaining base growth since 1990.
In sum, this exercise illustrates the difficulty
of determining the Fed’s long-run inflation ob-
jective from models of nominal GOP targeting.
The results for the TVC GOP and MA GOP
models show that alternative models of mone-
tary policy can explain base growth with fairly
similar success, while implying dramatically
different target paths for nominal GOP.
Moreover, the divergence in results for the TVC
and MA GOP models does not appear to have a
simple intuitive explanation. It appears that
Target
Actual
The rebased target GOP model has a lower32
Figure 7
Quarterly Growth in Monetary Base and Growth Implied by a








more time and data are needed to determine
which of these two models best describes mone-
tary policy objectives. In time we can observe
whether nominal GOP more closely adheres to
the MA GOP model’s 4.4 percent growth path
or the TVC GOP model’s 6.5 percent growth
path. Stated in terms of inflation rates, the MA
GOP model suggests that the average inflation
rate will be about 2 percent, allowing for
roughly 2.5 percent growth in potential real
GOP. The TVC GOP model, on the other hand,
predicts a higher average inflation rate of about
4 percent.
Fortunately, however, we are not forced to
draw inferences from only these two models,
because the rebased target GOP model appears
to dominate both in terms of in-sample, mean-
squared error in explaining base growth, From
the rebased target GOP model, which has a 5.7
percent target rate of nominal GOP growth, we
can infer that the Fed’s long-run inflation objec-
tive in the middle-to-late 1980s was approxi-
mately 3 percent. Furthermore, after allowing
for the slowdown in nominal GOP growth sur-
rounding the recession of 1990-91, the rebased
target GOP model does not forcefully indicate a
change inthe long-run inflation objective between
the 1980s and t990s. In this context, a persis-
tent and widening gap between target and actu-
al nominal GOP would suggest a change in the
long-run inflation objective, and no such gap de-
velops for the rebased target GOP model.
CHARACTERIZING MONETARY
POLICY FROM 1983-90 WITH AN
M2 TARGETING FEEDBACK RULE
As with models of nominal GOP targeting, I
construct models of M2 targeting that employ
both moving-average forecasts and forecasts
from a time-varying coefficient model. The
model that uses a time-varying coefficient fore-
casting method for the M2fbase ratio will be the
TVC M2 model, and the model that uses a
moving-average method will be the MA M2
model. The assumed short-run feedback rule be-
hind these two models is that the Fed sets base
growth to attempt to put M2 at the midpoint of
the announced M2 target range, given a fore-
cast of the M2/base ratio. Because M2 has
generally lagged below the midpoint (and often33
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below the bottom) of its target ranges in the
1990s, one objective of this exercise is to learn
whether the shortfall can be attributed to a
problem in predicting the M2/base ratio, or to a
decision on the part of policymakers to pursue
other objectives that preclude placing M2 at the
midpoint of the target range.
Figure 8 plots actual base growth and base
growth implied by the TVC M2 model. The
chart shows that differences between base
growth and base growth implied by the model
of M2 targeting are not noticeably larger in the
1990s than in the 1980s. Figure 9 provides simi-
lar results for the MA M2 model- Actual base
growth has been fairly consistent with the base
growth implied by either M2 targeting model.
Nevertheless, we know that M2 has been near
the bottom of or below its target range in the
1990s. Figure 10 plots M2’s position relative to
the midpoint of its target range to illustrate that
M2 has consistently been below the midpoint of
the target range since 1991. The substantial gap
between actual M2 and the midpoint of its tar-
get range stands at odds with the relatively
small differences between actual base growth
and base growth implied by the TVC M2 and
MA M2 models in figures 8 and 9. The two
forecast-based models of base growth have
falsely been suggesting that base growth has
been high enough to place M2 about the midpoint
of its target range. Evidently, forecast errors
are distorting these models of M2 targeting. To
verify that forecasting models are breaking
down, figure 11 shows actual growth in the
M2lbase ratio and growth forecasted by a time-
varying coefficient model. Figure 11 shows that
the forecasting model has been overpredicting
the M2/base ratio since 1991 by a large amount,
relative to pre-1991 prediction errors. Conse-
quently, the TVC M2 model since 1991 has been
implying rates of base growth that have subse-
quently proved insufficient to hit the midpoint
of the M2 target range.
The relationship between the monetary base
and M2 has apparently undergone such rapid
change that even a time varying coefficient
model has not kept pace. What has happened to
the relationship between the monetary base and
M2? The principal factor behind recent unantic-
ipated decreases in the M2/base ratio may be
the shrinking spread between rates paid on
small time and other checkable deposits. Liquid,
interest-bearing checkable deposits have become
more attractive as the spread has decreased. By
putting funds from maturing small time deposits
into other checkable deposits, savers force
banks to hold more reserves for a given level of
MZ—hence, decreases in the M2lbase ratio.
Empirical models have overpredicted the M2/
base ratio, largely because forecasting models
had not foreseen the magnitude of the substitu-
tion out of time deposits into other checkable
deposits.
Regulatory actions have also helped facilitate
the flow of funds out of small time deposits in
ways that statistical forecasting models could
not have anticipated. For example, in the after-
math of the savings-and-loan crisis, the Resolu-
tion Trust Corporation allowed purchasers of
failed thrifts to terminate small time deposits, a
key M2 component, at the time of takeover, and
allowed depositors at failed thrifts to withdraw
their money before maturity from small time
deposits without penalty. Together, these
changes have contributed to lower MZ/base ra-
tios than forecasting models had foreseen.
It is also interesting to note that the break-34
Figure 8
Quarterly Growth in Monetary Base and Growth Implied
by Midpoint of M2 Target Range andTVC Model Forecast
of M2IBase Ratio
Figure 9
Quarterly Growth in Monetary Base and Growth Implied
by Midpoint of M2 Target Range and Moving-Average
Forecasts of M2IBase Ratio
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Figure 11
Quarterly Growth in M2/Base Ratio and Growth
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Figure 12
Quarterly Growth in M2 Velocity and Forecasted Growth
from a Time-Varying Coefficient Model
down in the relationship between M2 and nar-
rower aggregates, like the monetary base, is
more pronounced than the much-discussed
breakdown in M2 velocity. A comparison of re-
cent forecast errors in the growth of the
M2/base ratio (figure 11) and growth in M2 ve-
locity (figure 12) shows that the Mzlbase ratio
has suffered larger forecast errors than M2 ve-
locity. For example, in the first quarter of 1993,
the forecasting model overpredicted growth in
the M2/hase ratio by more than 3 percentage
points for the quarter. The corresponding fore-
cast error for growth in base velocity never ap-
proaches such a size. Apart from their relative
magnitudes, errors in forecasting the M2/base
ratio and M2 velocity, when combined, help ex-
plain the FOMC’s decision to dc-emphasize M2
as a guide to monetary policy in July 1993.
First, in the current financial environment, it is
difficult to predict with precision the rate of
base growth needed to put M2 at the midpoint
of its target range. It is also difficult to predict
precisely the rate of nominal GOP growth that
will accompany a given rate of M2 growth.
Viewed this way, M2 has diminished value as an
intermediate policy target.
As a summary, table 2 contains measures of
the bias and mean-squared error between actual
and model-implied base growth, both in- and
out-of-sample, for the TVC M2 and MA M2
models as percents of the corresponding meas-
ures for the rebased target GOP model. The
models of M2 targeting have in-sample (1983-90),
mean-squared errors that are more than an order
of magnitude larger than that for the rebased
target GOP model. In the out-of-sample, post-1990
period, however, the models of M2 targeting
actually have lower mean-squared errors than
all three GOP targeting models. Nevertheless, as
discussed above, the breakdown in forecasting
models of the M2/base ratio prevents the M2
targeting models from providing reliable mone-
tary policy indicators in the 1990s.
SUMMARY
This article studies the policy prescriptions
embedded in feedback rules as monetary policy
indicators. The selected feedback rules give a
large role to forecasts, so recent difficulties in
forecasting the relationships between various
monetary aggregates and the level of nominal
spending have been emphasized. The results
from M2 targeting models suggest that Ma has
recently lost many of the properties—specifi-
cally, predictable relationships with narrow
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monetary policy instruments and stable velocity—
that had made it an attractive intermediate tar-
get. Furthermore, growth in the monetary base
has been consistent with growth implied by
models of Ma targeting in the 1990s. The short-
comings in M2 growth appear to stem from
shortfalls in the Ma/base ratio, relative to
predicted levels.
Among models of nominal GOP targeting, the
model that gradually adjusts the target path of
nominal GOP for past deviations from a desired
5.7 percent annual rate of nominal GOP growth
best explains base growth in terms of minimiz-
ing mean-squared error between 1983 and
1990. Furthermore, no persistent divergence has
appeared in the post-1990, out-of-sample period
between actual nominal GOP and the level im-
plied by the rebased target GOP model. Never-
theless, it is too early to tell whether monetary
policy will remain as consistent with that im-
plied by the rebased target model as it was in
the 1980s.
One attractive feature of the models of nomi-
nal GOP targeting is that they provide an esti-
mate of the desired long-run rate of nominal
GOP growth. From this rate, it is straightfor-
ward to calculate an approximate long-run infla-
tion objective by subtracting an estimate of the
rate of growth of potential real GOP. The result-
ing estimate of the implicit long-run inflation ob-
jective should be as credible as the assumptions
behind the policy model. Furthermore, because
one of the assumptions is that the Fed’s long-
run inflation objective remains constant, one
can use the nominal GOP targeting models to
search for possible shifts in that objective.
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Appendix
The Time-Varying Coefficient Model
Let V stand for either the income velocity of
the monetary base or the ratio between M2 and
the base, TB3 for the three-month T-bill rate
and MB for the monetary base. The model
generating the short-run forecasts is
(Al) Mn V, = f~0, +f3,,IITB3,, + f12,AInMB1
+
‘~-‘ Normal (O,h~)
h, = + (o~—o~) S
[o,i}
>
Probability(S, = iIs,, = 1) = p
Probability(S, = D]S,J = 0) = q.
The errors in equation (Al), e, have time-
varying volatilities in that their variance is as-
sumed to switch between a low and high level
according to a first-order Markov process.1
With time-varying coefficients, equation (Al)
tion before changing their views about the rela-
tionships among variables. This is essentially
why Engle and Watson (1985) advocate that
time-varying coefficients should have unit roots.
The innovations to the coefficients, v, are as-
sumed to be uncorrelated, so the covariance
matrix Qi sdiagonal. Kim (forthcoming) discuss-
es the specific form the Kalman filtering takes
for this model and the evaluation of the likeli-
hood function, which is maximized with respect
to
~ where Q~= o~,i = 1, 2, 3.
by construction, this model allows for two
sources of forecast error: error in predicting
the value of the coefficients and the hetero-
scedastic random disturbance. In general, in a
model with time-varying coefficients,
(A3) y, = X’ji, +
the one-step-ahead forecasts are
(A4) y~,.,= xç,j3~,., -
will be estimated using the Kalman filter under
the assumption that the state variables, /3,, fol-
low random walks:2
(AZ) (3, = /3,, +
The forecast errors have two components
which equal X ‘,,(/3 —f3~,,) +c,. If the variance of
R,~,.,and var(e,) a~, the one-step-
ahead, forecast~errorvariance is
Normal4’O,Q)
In a short-run forecasting context, the as-
sumption that the coefficients follow random
walks suggests that people need new informa-
(AS) IS-I, = I~I,,+ 1’4~= X’,,B,/JX,1
+
The first component (H1,) is called the variance
due to time-varying parameters (TVP); the se-
cond (H2,) is simply the variance of the random
tThe combination of time-varying parameters and this type
of heteroscedasticity was introduced by Kim (forthcoming).
Kim also ilustrates that this model of heteroscedasticity is
quite similar in practice to the well-known autoregressive
conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) model of Engle (1982).
Basically, the Markov model tries to match the persistence
of periods of high and low volatility in the data, where per-
sistence of high and low volatility states is increasing in p
and q, respectively.
2Bomhoff (1991) and Hem and Veugelers (1983) also use the
Kalman filter to forecast velocity. Bomhoff holds the interest
elasticity (fl1,) constant and restricts 132 to equal zero, so
past money growth is not included in his forecasts. Hem
and Veugelers restrict both and fl~,to equal zero, further
restricting the information set used for forecasting.
cnrn A~ ~A t~ ue’,ret- , F’,,39
disturbance e. Inferences about the relative H,,
sizes of the two sources of forecast error van- H + H
ance play an important role in updating the ‘~ It
coefficients. One can write the forecast y,~,4as
If H, is large relative to H,,, observers would at-
(AG) ~ = X’,fJ,,,., + Z,~,, tribute less of a forecast error to a change in
coefficients; instead, they would believe that it
was probably an outlier. A large value of H,,
where X, are the explanatory variables, rj,,, last then implies that last period’s forecast error
period’s forecast error (and therefore is the new would play a relatively small role in determining
information available), and 4 is proportional to next period’s forecast.